To forecast political elections, popular pollsters gather polls and combine information from them with fundamental data such as historical trends, the national economy, and incumbency. This process is complicated, and it includes many subjective choices (e.g., when identifying likely voters, estimating turnout, and quantifying other sources of uncertainty), leading to forecasts that differ between sources even when they use the same underlying polling data. With the goal of shedding light on election forecasts (using the United States as an example), we develop a framework for forecasting elections from the perspective of dynamical systems. Through a simple approach that borrows ideas from epidemiology, we show how to combine a compartmental model of disease spreading with public polling data to forecast gubernatorial, senatorial, and presidential elections at the state level. Our results for the 2012 and 2016 U.S. races are largely in agreement with those of popular pollsters, and we use our new model to explore how subjective choices about uncertainty impact results. Our goals are to open up new avenues for improving how elections are forecast, to increase understanding of the results that are reported by popular news sources, and to illustrate a fascinating example of data-driven forecasting using dynamical systems. We conclude by forecasting the senatorial and gubernatorial races in the 2018 U.S. midterm elections of 6 November.
Introduction
Despite what was largely viewed as an unexpected outcome for the 2016 Unites States presidential election, recent work [44] indicates that national polling data is not becoming less accurate. Election forecasting is a complicated, multi- This shows how our model trajectory compares with polling data for an example state. Our trajectories are smooth because we average polling data by month (to obtain the 11 purple-asterisk data points that we show). Although we obtain all of our forecasts by simulating the evolution of opinions in the year leading up to each election, for the remainder of this paper, we focus on the result at time t = 0 days to the election (i.e., our final forecast on the eve of the election). (D) We are interested in forecasting at the level of states, but for elections with many state races, we simplify the problem by combining all reliable (safe) Republican and Democrat regions into two super states (Red and Blue, to use traditional party colors). In this schematic, we show the super states for presidential elections.
Background
Because we repurpose our approach to forecasting elections from epidemic modeling (for example, see refs. [35, 38, 40, 46] ), we begin with a brief introduction to these techniques before describing our model in the next section.
Compartmental Modeling of Infections
Compartmental models [35, 38, 40, [46] [47] [48] are one of the standard mathematical approaches for studying biological contagions. They were developed initially for analyzing the spread of biological diseases such as influenza [37] and Zika [60] , but contagion models (often combined with network structure to model social connectivity) have also been used for the study of social contagions, including the dynamics of memes [59] and rumors [61] , the movement of rioting waves across cities [34] , and the adaption of scientific techniques [33] . This family of models is built on the idea that one can categorize individuals into a few distinct types (i.e., "compartments"). One then describes contagion dynamics using flux terms between the various compartments. For example, the well-known susceptible-infectedsusceptible (SIS) compartmental model breaks a population into two classes. At a given time, an individual can be either susceptible (S) or infected (I). As we illustrate in Fig. 1A , the fraction of susceptible and infected individuals in a community varies depending on two factors:
• transmission: when an infected individual interacts with a susceptible individual, the susceptible person has some chance of becoming infected; and • recovery: an infected person has some chance of recovering (and becoming susceptible again). Recovery depends only on the number of people currently infected, but transmission depends on the number of connections between susceptible and infected individuals.
Suppose that S(t) and I(t), respectively, are the fraction of susceptible and infected individuals in a well-mixed population at time t. One then describes the spread of infection by the following set of ordinary differential equations:
where S(t) + I(t) = 1 and the two parameters, γ and β, correspond to the rates of disease transmission and recovery, respectively. (For details, see Materials and Methods.) The SIS model has been extended to account for more realistic details, such as multiple diseases/contagions, communities, and contact structure between individuals or subpopulations [31, 39, 49, 53, 54] . Mathematically, this entails adjusting the system [1] [2] to include additional terms and equations. The commonality of a compartmental approach to contagion dynamics, whether one employs a simplistic example or an intricate one, is that one divides a population into categories, and there are mechanisms for individuals to change categories.
Results
We now construct a model of elections in the form of a compartmental model.
Our Election Model
Our model of election dynamics is a two-pronged SIS compartmental model (see Fig. 1A ). First, we reinterpret "susceptible" individuals as undecided (or independent or minor-party) voters. Because most U.S. elections are dominated by two parties, we then consider two contagions: Democrat and Republican voting intentions. We are interested in forecasting elections at the level of states, so we track these quantities within each state. In particular, let S i = fraction of undecided voters in the ith state , I i D = fraction of Democrat voters in the ith state , I i R = fraction of Republican voters in the ith state ,
We account for four behaviors: • Democrat transmission: undecided voters can become Democrat due to interactions with Democrats; • Republican transmission: similarly, undecided voters can become Republican due to interactions with Republicans; • Democrat turnover: an infected person has some chance of changing their mind to undecided (this amounts to "recovering"); and • Republican turnover: an infected person has some chance of becoming undecided (i.e., recovering). It is important to note that, while contagion language does not necessarily apply to social dynamics [52] , we use such language to describe voters in this paper. These terms highlight that our model is not a specialized election-forecasting model, as part of our goal is to highlight how a simple framework can provide meaningful forecasts of high-dimensional systems. We thus expect similar ideas to provide insight into forecasting in many complex systems.
By extending the traditional SIS model [1] [2] to account for two contagions and M states or super states (see Fig. 1D ), we obtain the following system of coupled ordinary differential equations:
where N is the total number of likely voters in the U.S.; N j is the number of likely voters in state j; and γ i D and γ i R describe the rates of committed Democrats and Republicans, respectively, converting to the undecided compartment. Similarly, β ij D and β ij R correspond, respectively, to the transmission (i.e., influence) rates from Democrat and Republican voters in state j to undecided individuals in state i. We obtain our parameters by fitting to a year of state polling data (averaged by month to remove small-scale fluctuations; see Fig. 1C ) from HuffPost Pollster [9] and RealClearPolitics [10] ; see Materials and Methods for details. We obtain measurements of the number of voting age individuals per state from the Federal Register [28] [29] [30] , and we make the simplifying assumption that all states have the same voter turnout, so this parameter cancels out of our model. Our parameters are different for each election, as we use the public polls and population data specific to each election for fitting.
The β parameters provide a means of modeling directed relationships between states, and we interpret transmission interactions broadly. While opinion persuasion (i.e., transmission) can occur through communication between undecided and committed voters [55] , we expect that it can also occur through candidate campaigning, news coverage, and televised debates. We hypothesize that these venues serve as an indirect means for voters in one state to influence another. For example, if news coverage of Republican campaigning in Pennsylvania resonates with undecided voters in Ohio, this may provide an indirect route of opinion transmission from Pennsylvania to Ohio and increase β OH,PA R . Therefore, we consider large β ij R to mean that Republicans in state j strongly influence undecided voters in state i, and such "strong influence" may be due either to conversations between voters or due to indirect effects like state-state affinity influenced (or even activated) by media.
After we fit our parameters to polling data for a given election, we use our model [3-5] to simulate the daily evolution of political opinions from the preceding January through election day, using the earliest available polling data to specify our initial conditions (see Materials and Methods). If any undecided voters remain at the end of our simulation, we make the naive choice to assume that they vote for minor-party candidates or simply do not vote. By contrast, FiveThirtyEight.com [58] assigns most voters who remain undecided on election day to the major parties and Huffington Post [43] incorporates undecided voters into their measurements of uncertainty.
Election Simulations
We now use our model [3-5] to simulate past races for governor, senate, and president positions. Because realistic forecasts should incorporate uncertainty, we follow this exploration of past races with a short study of the impact of noise on our 2016 presidential forecast. To do this, we introduce a stochastic differential equation (SDE) version of our model, and we conclude our election simulations by using this probabilistic model to forecast the gubernatorial and senatorial midterm races on 6 November 2018.
and 2016 Election Forecasts
By fitting our model parameters to polling data for senatorial, gubernatorial, and presidential races in 2012 and 2016 without incorporating the final election results, we can simulate forecasts for these elections as if we made them on the eve of the respective election days. In Fig. 2 , we summarize our forecast results for these races. It is insightful to compare our forecast to the final forecasts from popular pollsters. As we show in Table 1 , our model has a similar success rate at calling party outcomes at the state level as FiveThirtyEight.com [1] and Sabato's Crystal Ball [3] . Our mean accuracy for presidential elections in 2012 and 2016 is 94.1%, while FiveThirtyEight.com achieves a mean success rate of 95.1% and Sabato's Crystal Ball follows slightly behind at 93.1%. To our knowledge, gubernatorial forecasts and 2012 senatorial forecasts are not currently available from FiveThirtyEight.com, so we compare our model performance for these races with Sabato's Crystal Ball. Across the states for which forecasts are available from both our model and Sabato, we forecast 92.3% of 65 state senatorial races correctly; Sabato's Crystal Ball achieves a success rate of 93.8%. Similarly, our forecasts have a mean accuracy of 90.5% for the 21 gubernatorial races in 2012 and 2016, for which Sabato's predictions average 81.0% success.
Taken together, Fig. 2 and Table 1 highlight two related goals in election forecasting: (1) forecasting the vote share by state (e.g., the percents of the state vote received by Democrat and Republican candidates), and (2) calling the final winning party by state (i.e., which party's candidate wins the election in a given state). Many popular pollsters, including the Cook Political Report [6] and Sabato's Crystal Ball [3], focus on the second goal, whereas our model and FiveThirtyEight.com's algorithm [1] provides a means of pursuing both goals. Media coverage and public attention are skewed heavily toward the second goal, yet the first aim represents a more challenging problem with delicate, finer Table 1 : Comparison of success rates for our model and popular sources. Note that senatorial and gubernatorial forecasts are not provided or calculated for all states that hold elections in a given year. We report success rates only for states for which forecasts are available from both Sabato's Crystal Ball [3] and our model.
details.

Accounting for and Interpreting Uncertainty
Election forecasting involves not only calling a race for a specific party and forecasting vote shares, but also specifying the likelihood of different outcomes. This raises a third goal of pollsters that is easy for forecast readers to overlook. This goal entails (3) quantifying uncertainty (e.g., estimating the chance that a specific candidate has of winning an election). Quantifying and interpreting uncertainty is important, and we suggest that this is one of the key places where mathematical techniques can contribute most successfully to election forecasting. We explore randomness by reframing our model [3-5] as a system of stochastic differential equations:
where, with a slight abuse of notation, we now consider I i D , I i R , and S i to be stochastic processes and let W i R and W i S be Wiener processes. We selected the noise strength σ to roughly match our 80% confidence intervals to those of FiveThirtyEight.com [11] .
FiveThirtyEight.com [58] has highlighted several sources of uncertainty, but for concreteness and simplicity, we focus on accounting for errors based on shared demographics. In particular, although U.S. president, senate, and governor elections are decided at the level of states, polling errors are correlated in regions with similar populations. Thus, if a pollster is wrong in Minnesota, they may be systematically off in states (such as Wisconsin) with shared features [58] . This type of error makes it possible for polls on a bloc of similar states to all be wrong together, leading to an unforeseen upset.
To shed light on how uncertainty effects both election results and forecasts, we explore a few simple approaches for including randomness in the form of additive white noise. In particular, we compare the impact of uncorrelated noise with the effect of additive noise correlated on a few sample demographics; specifically, we consider the fractions of Black, Hispanic, and college-educated individuals in a population. (See Materials and Methods for details). We corre-late on these demographics simply because these data are readily available; future work should incorporate additional demographic data.
We account for uncertainty by tweaking the voter populations in each state at every time step by a small random number; when noise is uncorrelated, we pick these small numbers independently. By contrast, correlating noise implies that the numbers are related in similar states; for example, we can randomly tweak a set of states with a similar feature (e.g., high Hispanic population) in the same direction (e.g., up one percentage point for one candidate) at one time. Simulating a large number (e.g., we use 10,000) elections then results in a distribution of possible outcomes and allows us to quantify our forecast uncertainty. To illustrate the impact of these different means of accounting for uncertainty, we show the distributions that result from these methods for the 2016 U.S. presidential election in Fig. 3 Our initial analysis illustrates how accounting for uncertainty in these different ways strongly influences election forecasts, echoing points raised by Silver and his team [58] . In Fig. 3 , we demonstrate that uncorrelated noise, which can model uncertainty in a single state or a poll without assuming a larger systematic (e.g., country-wide) polling problem, results in a very low likelihood of a Republican win in 2016. By contrast, correlating outcomes by a few demographics, which can model systematic polling errors (e.g., due to misidentifying likely voters) in similar states, increases Donald Trump's chances by a factor of about four. This agrees with Silver's comment [58] that failing to account for correlated error tends to result in underestimations of a trailing candidate's chances.
Note that we are not attempting to measure or account directly for errors in polling data. Instead, we take the simple approach of assuming that we can incorporate all sources of uncertainty as an additive noise term in our model [6] [7] [8] .
There has been extensive work on quantifying uncertainty (see [51] ), and exploring alternative, more subtle ways of measuring and accounting for uncertainty is an important future direction for research on forecasting complex systems.
Senate and Governor Forecasts
Because our model has similar success as the popular pollsters in its forecasts of the 2012 and 2016 U.S. elections, we now use it to forecast the upcoming 2018 senatorial and gubernatorial races. For the remainder of the paper, note that we are simulating the SDE version of our model [6] [7] [8] that accounts for uncertainty by correlating noise on education, ethnicity, and race demographics within states. With one exception (see Figures 5B-C) , we base these forecasts on 10,000 runs of this model. This allows us to comment on all three of the goals that we mentioned earlier: forecasting state vote shares (see Fig. 4 ), calling the winning party for each state (see Figures 5B-C) , and providing estimates for the likelihood of these and alternative outcomes (see Fig. 5 ).
As we show in Fig. 4 , our forecast Republican and Democrat vote shares are reasonably similar to those of FiveThir-tyEight.com [12] . In particular, their mean results fall within the range that includes 80% of our simulated elections. (We categorize these states as safe based on the forecasts of Sabato's Crystal Ball [13] , 270toWin.com [14] , the New York Times [15] , and RealClearPolitics.com [10] on 28 August 2018.)
We differ most strikingly in our forecasts for Florida and Tennessee: FiveThirtyEight.com [12] lists Florida as leaning Democrat, but our model (based on data through 24 October 2018) sees this race as a toss-up with a weak Republican lean (see Fig. 5B ). Moreover, the most recent forecast by our model (based on data through 3 November 2018) places Florida just over the line into the "Lean Republican" category. Tennessee, by contrast, is a likely red state according to FiveThirtyEight.com, but we view it as a toss-up state with a slightly higher chance to go blue. The result is that both FiveThirtyEight.com 's classic forecast [12] (accessed on 1 November 2018) and our model project the same expected total outcome: a 52/48 Republican/Democrat senatorial breakdown after the midterm elections. In Figures 6 and 7 , we show our forecasts for the gubernatorial elections that will occur on 6 November 2018, and we compare them with those of several popular pollsters. We highlight that both our model and FiveThirtyEight.com [17] identify a relatively large number of "toss-up" states, with nearly 50-50 chances for Republican or Democrat governors, despite the fact that both approaches use polling data that extends until just a few days before election day. As we show in Fig. 7 , we differ most with the popular pollsters in our categorization of Iowa and Ohio. Although FiveThirtyEight.com [17] , Sabato's Crystal Ball [18] , the Cook Political Report [19] , and Nathan Gonzales' Inside Elections [20] all report Iowa and Ohio as toss-up states (or "Tilt Democrat", a weaker tendency than "Lean Democrat", for Iowa in the case of Inside Elections), our model forecasts that both of these states lean Democrat. This is particularly striking in Ohio, where we assign the Democrat candidate a 74.5% chance of winning. Of course, these forecast are probabilistic by nature, and it is important to keep this in mind when interpreting our forecasts and those of popular pollsters. Forecast result for Senate composition based on our model (on 24 October 2018) using noise correlated on education, ethnicity, and race demographics to account for uncertainty. Our model suggests that the most likely event is a Democrat win in the Senate, most of our simulations lead to Republican-dominated outcomes, and we forecast a 52/48 Republican/Democrat split on average. (B) Categorization of states as solid, likely, lean, or toss-up. It is important to note that our most recent model forecast for the senate races using polling data [10] through 3 November 2018the rightmost column* -is based on 4,000 simulated elections instead of the usual 10,000 and uses a time step for parameter fitting that is five times larger than we use in our other forecasts. (We only categorize states that we have not already designated as "Safe Red" or "Safe Blue"; see the caption of Fig. 4 for details.) Both our model and the approach of FiveThirtyEight.com [12] provide precise numbers to quantify uncertainty, whereas Sabato's Crystal Ball [13] and the Cook Political Report [16] do not report such values. For our model and the approach of FiveThirtyEight.com, the number that we show indicates the chance of a Democrat winning the respective state's senatorial race if it is in a blue box and the chance of Republican winning if it is in a red box. For toss-up states (gray), the number that we show is red (respectively, blue) if it corresponds to a Republican's (respectively, Democrat's) chance of winning. FiveThir-tyEight.com's values are based on the "classic" version of their model last updated at 1:19 PM Eastern Time on 4 November 2018. (C) Map of the state ratings by party as forecasted by our model using data through 3 November (note that this forecast uses fewer simulated elections than our other model forecasts; see Materials and Methods for details).
Conclusions and Discussion
We developed a simple method for forecasting elections using compartmental models from epidemiology, and we illustrated the promise of such a dynamical-systems approach by applying it to the U.S. races for president, senate, [17] . In this plot, we show the expected margins for swing states only; our model forecasts that the mean margin in the Safe Red super state (i.e., AL, AZ, AR, ID, MD, MA, NE, NH, SC, TN, TX, VT, and WY) will be +18.5 points for Republican candidates and that the mean margin in the Safe Blue super state (i.e., CA, CO, HI, IL, MI, MN, NM, NY, PA, and RI) will be +15.6 points for Democrats. and governor in 2012 and 2016. In our modeling, we persistently chose the simplest, most naive option to avoid incorporating further complexity into our forecasting methodology. Although our model is simple and the spread of contagions differs from voting dynamics, we were able to achieve similar success rates as popular pollsters for these past elections. This heartening result suggests that our novel approach to forecasting elections is a promising avenue for future research, and we offered our forecast of the 2018 senatorial and gubernatorial elections as a test of our model. We consider simplicity to be a virtue in this first model, as part of our goal is to help demystify the election forecasting process, highlight future research directions on the forecasting of elections (and other complex systems), and motivate community members to engage more actively with pollster interpretations and raise further questions themselves. There are numerous ways to build further on our basic modeling approach. For example, it will be useful to be more careful about how to handle undecided and minor-party voters. In our model, we tracked the fraction of the population that is undecided, Republican, and Democrat within each state. This raises the question of how to interpret the presence of undecided (i.e., susceptible) voters on the day of an election. FiveThirtyEight.com [58] assigns a voting opinion (mostly to one of the major parties) to any undecided voters who remain on election day. By contrast, we assumed that all undecided voters are either minor-party voters or simply do not vote. The Huffington Post factors undecided voters into the uncertainty in an election year [43] . Using the fraction of undecided voters to inform our choice of how much uncertainty to include in our model is an interesting and important future direction to pursue.
We made the simplifying assumption that all polls are equally accurate (e.g., we did not consider the time to election and pollster-reported error), and we did not distinguish between partisan and non-partisan polls or between polls of likely voters, registered voters, and adults. By contrast, FiveThirtyEight.com [58] relies on careful measures [21] of pollingfirm accuracy to weight polls in different ways, and they adjust polls of registered voters and adults to frame all of their data in terms of likely voters. Using FiveThirtyEight.com's pollster ratings [21] to weight polls in our model would allow us to comment more broadly on how various subjective choices made by pollsters effect their final forecasts. Similarly, future work can compare the influence of noise correlated based on demographics with the effects of noise Fig. 6 for details.) The forecasts that we reproduce from FiveThirtyEight.com [17] are for their "classic" version, which was last updated at 1:19 PM Eastern Time on 4 November 2018. We obtained the forecasts that we reproduce from Sabato's Crystal Ball [18] , the Cook Political Report [19] , and Nathan Gonzales' Inside Elections [20] from their websites on 4 November. They were last updated online on 26 October, 26 October, and 1 November, respectively. Inside Elections [20] further breaks down their state ratings to include the "Tilt" category, which appears between "Toss-Up" and "Lean", so we also include these notes in our table. correlated based on the last 80 years of state voting history (which is the technique used by The Huffington Post [43] ).
Rather than showing simulated timelines of political opinion evolution in the year leading up to an election, we focused on presenting eve-of-election-day forecasts. Moreover, when fitting our parameters, we averaged poll results [9, 10] by month, producing a single polling data point per 30 days. This technique throws away daily fluctuations in opinions and smooths out interesting dynamics like "convention bounce". (As described by FiveThirtyEight.com [58] , candidates often receive a short spike in support after their party's convention.) With a finer view on daily poll results, one can incorporate the effects of conventions or other time-specific events (e.g., a large rally or a new story about a candidate in the media) into our model. Indeed, the field of dynamical systems provides an appropriate means for exploring the time evolution of political opinions, as well as their interplay with external forces -such as the media, rallies, or conventions -that may impact the system.
Lastly, our compartmental-model approach allowed us to obtain parameters related to the strength of interactions between states (the β parameters in Eqns. [3-5]) and measurements of voter turnover by state (the γ parameters in Eqns. [3-5]) for each election year and race. By comparing these parameters across various years and different types of elections, one can help identify blocks of states that persistently influence each other, analyze which states have the most plastic voter populations, and suggest key differences in the political dynamics in presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial races. More importantly, this and other future research directions can provide insight into how these quantities evolve across years, allowing researchers to suggest ways that the U.S. electorate may be changing in time that can potentially be useful for future forecasts.
Materials and Methods
Data Sets
We obtained publicly-available polling data for the 2012 and 2016 elections from HuffPost Pollster [9] using their Pollster API v2 [22] . HuffPost Pollster [9] provides both state-level and national-level polls for these elections. Because our model tracks the evolution of political opinions within individual states, we chose to use only state-level polling data to fit our parameters. State-level polling data for the 2018 midterms is not currently available from HuffPost Pollster [9] , so we collected data for the 2018 governor and senate elections by hand from RealClearPolitics.com [10] . For all simulated elections, we include only polls in the 330 days leading up to each election in our data set. In particular, for elections in November, we include polls between January and November. We use 2012, 2016, and 2017 estimates of voting-age populations by state from the Federal Register [29, 30, 30] to specify N and N i in Eqns. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . (We use 2017 in place of 2018 because this year's data is not available yet.) To correlate noise in Eqns. [6] [7] [8] , we used ethnicity and race demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau [23] and data on state education levels presented in a study on 247WallSt.com [24] . While these data sources are for 2016, we used them for our 2018 simulations as well.
Selecting "Safe Red" and "Safe Blue" Super States To simplify our model and because polling data is often sparser for states that are viewed as having a reliable lean towards a specific party, we focus on forecasting the elections in swing states and treat all reliably Red and Blue states together as two "super state" conglomerates. (Note that we do not specify that these super states actually vote Republican and Democrat, respectively; rather, that is an output of our model.) This raises the question of how to identify states as "safe" or "swing", and we do this differently for different elections. For the 2012 and 2016 presidential races, we define our swing states as those identified by FiveThirtyEight.com as "traditional swing states" [25] ; these are CO, FL, IA, MI, MN, NV, NH, NC, OH, PA, VA, and WI (see Fig. 1D ). Thus, M = 14 in Eqns. .., 14 are the voter fractions in the 12 swing states. To define our Safe Red and Safe Blue super states in senate and governor races, we average the forecasts of popular pollsters. For the 2018 senate race, we combine the August 2018 ratings of Sabato's Crystal Ball [13] , 270toWin.com (the consensus version) [14] , and the New York Times Upshot [15] , leading to 14 swing states. Our 2018 governor race categorizations are means of the ratings of FiveThirtyEight.com [17] , the Cook Political Report [19] , Sabato's Crystal Ball [18] , and Nathan Gonzales' Inside Elections [20] . We base our categorizations for senate races in 2012 on the ratings of Sabato's Crystal Ball [26] and the New York Times [27] . We obtain categorizations for our 2016 senate model by averaging the ratings of 270toWin.com, Sabato's Crystal Ball, and The Huffington Post. Because there were not many governor races in 2012 and 2016, we treat every state separately for these elections.
Additional Modeling Details
The dynamics of recovery and transmission in the traditional susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model are given by the following ordinary differential equations:
whereS(t) andĨ(t), respectively, are the mean numbers of susceptible and infected individuals in a population at time t and [SĨ] is the mean number of connections between infected and susceptible individuals. This system is not closed, so we approximate [49] the number of connections as [SĨ] ≈S · n ·Ĩ/N , where N is the total number of individuals in a population and n is the mean number of connections per person. If we define β =βn, we obtain the following closed 
We thereby estimate the number of interactions between undecided voters in state i and Democrats in state j, for example, as the mean number of interactions that involve an undecided voter in state i multiplied by the probability the interaction is with someone in state j multiplied by the probability that someone in state j is a Democrat. In making these approximations, we are assuming that an undecided voter is equally likely to interact with a Republican or Democrat across the U.S. In particular, we do not assume that interactions are more likely between individuals in the same state or between those in neighboring states. We assume that the number of interactions between individuals in different states depends only on the size of the states and on the number of Republicans, Democrats, and undecided voters currently therein. For our investigation of correlated polling uncertainty in Figures 3B, 4 , 5, and 7, we include correlated noise in Eqns. [6] [7] [8] . We quantify the similarity of two states for a given population demographic using the Jaccard index:
where D i is the population fraction of the given demographic in state i and D j is the population fraction for that demographic in state j. The Jaccard index indicates the covariance for our Wiener processes W i R and W i S . As we discussed earlier (see the subsection "Accounting for and Interpreting Uncertainty"), we consider three sample demographics. In our calculations, J B denotes the Jaccard index calculated using the fraction of Black individuals in the state populations, J E is the Jaccard index for the fractions of individuals without a college education in the given two states, and J H is the Jaccard index based on the fractions of Hispanic individuals in a state. For our forecasts with correlated noise, we simulate our model [6] [7] [8] 10,000 times (with the exception of our 2018 senate forecast based on data through 3 November 2018; this forecast is based on 4,000 simulated elections); for each simulated election, we select one Jaccard index uniformly at random among J B , J E , and J H to use as the covariance for our noise.
Parameter Fitting
To fit model parameters for a given election, we first format the public polling data we have collected for the 330 days leading up to that election. Because some states are polled much more frequently than others, we reduce the number of polling data points used to fit the model to 11 per state (or super state). This is done by binning the polls for each state in 30 day increments (extending backward from election day) and then averaging within these bins to arrive at 11 data points per state (or super state). If a given state has no polls for one of the 30 day increments, we approximate it by linear interpolation. In many cases, there are no polls for a state in the early months of the year, and we account for this by setting all missing early data points for that state to its earliest available polling result. We follow the same approach to arrive at 11 data points each for the Safe Red and Safe Blue super states. Note that we do not weight the polls used to compute these average data points for super states by state sizes; this represents a place our model could be improved.
When computing the 11 data points for a state, we include all polling data available from HuffPost Pollster [22] (for 2012 and 2016) and RealClearPolitics [10] (for 2018). We do not leave out partisan polls or weight better pollsters more heavily (as does FiveThirtyEight.com [58] ). Moreover, we do not treat polls differently in any way if they are polls of likely voters, registered voters, or adults.
The result of this process is 11 data points per state (or super state) that provide the percentage of Democrat, Republican, and undecided (or minor-party) votes within that state (e.g., 33 numbers in all). We use these compartmentwise numbers to fit the model in Eqns. [3-5] to the observed time-course polling data. To describe the fitting procedure, consider the vector consisting of the observed compartment-wise polling numbers at time t i , scaled by the state (or super state) total size and stacked in the "concentration" vector C(t i ). For instance, for the presidential election, the vector C(t i ) is the 3 × 14 = 42 dimensional vector holding all of the states' (or super states') compartment-specific empirical proportions. Further, consider the corresponding solution, c β,γ (t i ), to the the system in Eqns. [3] [4] [5] , indexed by the unknown parameters (β, γ), with dependence on the initial condition suppressed. The parameter vector (β, γ) contains the various transmission and recovery parameters. The parameter estimates (β,γ) are found via the leastsquares criteria; that is, (β,γ) = argmin (β,γ) i C(t i ) − c β,γ (t i ) 2 2 . Consistency and weak convergence to Gaussian laws of these estimators, given that the data are from a density dependent Markov jump process, has been shown in [57] .
Numerical Implementation
We implement parameter fitting using R (version 3.4.2) [56] . Specifically, we use the OPTIM routine to perform constrained optimization of the least-squares objective function, subject to non-negative rate constraints [36] with time step ∆t = 0.1 month. This time step is used in all cases except for our 2018 senate forecast based on data through 3 November 2018 (for this forecast we use ∆t = 0.5 month). We simulate our differential equations in MATLAB (VER-SION 9.3), THE MATHWORKS, INC., NATICK, MA, USA. We solve Eqns. [3-5] using a forward Euler scheme and Eqns. [6] [7] [8] with the Euler-Maruyama method [41] . We utilize the fact that S i + I i R + I i D = 1 to reduce our model to two equations per state (or super state) when solving it numerically. The time step in both cases is ∆t = 0.1 day, and we simulate from January 1 up until election day. (As a simplification, we assume that each month has 30 days; thus, for example, we simulate the 2018 races for 306 days.) The noise strength that we use in Eqns. [6] [7] [8] is σ = 0.0015 for all stochastic simulations (namely, the results in Figures 3, 4 , 5, and 7). (We choose this value so that our 80% ranges roughly have a similar length as those provided in presidential forecasts by FiveThirtyEight.com [11] .)
Other Notes
Working with election data is occasionally messy, and we comment on a few special cases in our work.
(1) Polling data from HuffPost [9] was not available for the Delaware and West Virginia 2012 governor races, so we do not provide forecasts for these states.
(2) In some cases, a state race features two candidates from the same party. (For example, California has two Democrats running for Senator in 2018.) Because our model assumes a race of a Democrat facing a Republican, we do not use polling data from states with a single-party race.
(3) In cases where an independent is running in place of a Democrat (e.g., the Vermont 2018 senatorial race), we treat the independent as if they were Democrat for modeling and parameter fitting. (For the 2012 senate race in Vermont, however, our simulations in Fig. 2B leave this state out.) (4) We focus on polling data that compares two candidates. In particular, we do not include polls for which the data are reported with a third candidate or races in which there are three candidates who each get reasonably large shares of the vote. The polls that we found from RealClearPolitics.com [10] for New Mexico's 2018 senate race were for three candidates, so we do not include New Mexico's polls in our averaged data points for the Safe Blue super state for this election. We also do not forecast the Maine 2012 senate race because it had three popular candidates.
